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Footnotes 
1. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a).
2. Id. § 5000A(b); see also id. § 5000A(e) (exempting several classes
of individuals).
3. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
4. Id. at 2586 (Roberts, C.J.).
We begin with a dilemma.  Is there any corner of theAmerican legal landscape in which readers have notalready received word of the Supreme Court’s mon-
umental healthcare ruling in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius?  Then again, can one imagine any retro-
spective on the Court’s 2011-2012 Term that does not make
that ruling its headline?  We will start by unapologetically giv-
ing NFIB its due, taking a broad view of the ruling’s key ele-
ments and of the future battlegrounds to which the ruling
points.  We then will turn to many of the Term’s other civil
cases, focusing particularly on decisions that are likely to be of
broad interest to those who work or litigate in the nation’s state
and federal courtrooms.  Those rulings address important
issues in the areas of administrative law, arbitration, Bivens
actions, due process, equal protection, federal jurisdiction,
qualified immunity, religion, speech, the Supremacy Clause,
and more.
THE HEALTHCARE RULING:  COMMERCE, TAXES, AND
SPENDING
In the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Congress’s central purpose was to bring the nation closer to
universal healthcare coverage.  In the litigation that was imme-
diately launched against the legislation, two provisions were
primarily at issue.  First, Congress imposed what became
known as the “individual mandate,” stating that, beginning in
2014, many Americans would be required to carry “minimum
essential [health insurance] coverage.”1 Unless they fell
within an exempted segment of the population, those who
failed to carry such insurance would be required to pay a
“penalty,” or a “shared responsibility payment,” to the Internal
Revenue Service when filing their annual taxes.2 Second, to
help provide healthcare for many who could not afford to buy
insurance, Congress adopted a plan to expand the Medicaid
program to cover Americans whose incomes placed them
below 133 percent of the federal poverty line.  The federal gov-
ernment ultimately would pay 90 percent of the costs of that
expansion, but the states would cover the rest.  States that
refused to participate faced powerful repercussions: they could
lose all of their federal Medicaid funds.  Joined by numerous
organizations and individuals, roughly half of the nation’s
states sued, arguing that the individual mandate and the threat
to states’ Medicaid funding exceeded Congress’s enumerated
powers.  The Court took up those matters in NFIB,3 one of the
most closely watched cases in the nation’s history.
THE COMMERCE POWER AND THE MANDATE
Opponents of the individual mandate famously insisted
that, if the mandate were held valid, then Congress could dic-
tate all kinds of purchasing decisions, right down to the food
we buy at the grocery store.  At times, that argument had the
feel of a substantive-due-process claim, drawing some of its
rhetorical power from the implied premise that there is a realm
of personal decision making that no government can invade.
Rather than cast their legal arguments in those controversial
terms, however, the Act’s challengers urged the Court to draw
an activity/inactivity distinction under the Commerce Clause,
the enumerated power upon which Congress had most vocally
relied when adopting the mandate.  The mandate’s opponents
argued that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to reg-
ulate the economic activities of those who have already entered
a given market, but does not empower Congress to force peo-
ple to enter a market in which they do not wish to participate.
Four Justices rejected that argument, finding the mandate
easily sustainable under conventional Commerce Clause
analysis.  Writing for herself and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that most uninsured
Americans actively seek healthcare each year—imposing bil-
lions of dollars in costs on the healthcare system—and that
nearly all uninsured Americans will require healthcare at some
point in their lives.  States cannot sustainably address the
resulting economic challenges on their own, she said, because
any state that unilaterally moves toward a system of universal
coverage will become a financially strained magnet for eco-
nomically disadvantaged individuals.  Under those circum-
stances, Justice Ginsburg concluded, the Commerce Clause
gave Congress ample power to require many Americans to
carry health insurance.
The Court’s other five Justices, however, embraced the pro-
posed activity/inactivity distinction.  Writing only for himself,
Chief Justice Roberts stated that the power to “regulate” inter-
state commerce is not the power to “create” interstate com-
merce.4 He found it unimaginable that the Framers would
have authorized Congress to force people to buy goods or ser-
vices from private sellers.  The Chief Justice believed that
allowing Congress to wield such a power would “fundamen-
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5. Id. at 2589 (Roberts, C.J.).
6. Id. at 2588 (Roberts, C.J.).
7. Id. at 2591 (Roberts, C.J.).
8. He rejected the federal government’s arguments under the
Necessary and Proper Clause for substantially the same reasons.
9. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., reaf-
firming a right to abortion); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)
(jointly and unanimously declaring that state officials are obliged
to abide by the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the
Constitution).
10. 132 S. Ct. at 2644 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dis-
senting).
11. Id. at 2648 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
12. Id. at 2643 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
13. Id. at 2676-77 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissent-
ing).
14. That may have been the result of a short-term breakdown in the
working relationship among those five Justices.  There are strong
textual indications that much of the joint dissent was originally
written as a majority opinion, with Chief Justice Roberts on board.
Soon after the ruling was issued, leaks from the Court to the press
indicated that the Chief Justice and the four dissenters were
indeed initially united in declaring the individual mandate uncon-
stitutional.  See generally Adam Liptak, After Ruling, Roberts Makes
a Getaway from the Scorn, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2012, at A10;
Jonathan Peters, The Supreme Court Leaks, SLATE.COM, July 6,
2012, available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/jurisprudence/2012/07/the_supreme_court_leaking_john
_robert_s_decision_to_change_his_mind_on_health_care_should
_not_come_as_such_a_surprise_.html.
15. Compare Randy Barnett, We Lost on Health Care.  But the
Constitution Won., WASH. POST, June 29, 2012, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/randy-barnett-we-lost-
on-health-care-but-the-const i tut ion-won/2012/06/29/
gJQAzJuJCW_story.html (“The Supreme Court has definitively
ruled that the [individual mandate exceeded Congress’s commerce
power].”), with Deborah Pearlstein, Early Thoughts on the Health
Care Case, BALKINIZATION, June 28, 2012, http://balkin.blog
spot.com/2012/06/early-thoughts-on-health-care-case.html
(“Aren’t all the opinions (the dissent + Roberts’ opinion for him-
self) concluding that the mandate exceeds the Commerce Clause
power just dicta?”).
16. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
tally chang[e] the relation between the citizen and the federal
government.”5 On the government’s reading of the commerce
power, he said, Congress could “justify a mandatory purchase
to solve almost any problem,”6 regulating people’s lives “from
cradle to grave.”7 The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress
to regulate only extant economic activities, the Chief Justice
concluded, and individuals who have not purchased health
insurance and are not currently seeking medical care are not
active in the healthcare market.8
In a rare joint opinion9 that they formally cast as a dissent,
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito made arguments
that were substantially the same as the Chief Justice’s.  They
found that “one does not regulate commerce that does not
exist by compelling its existence,”10 and that saying otherwise
would “extend federal power to virtually everything,”11 mak-
ing “mere breathing in and out the basis for federal prescrip-
tion.”12 The four Justices drew a connection between the deci-
sion-making freedom that the Act’s challengers were claiming
and the limitations on Congress’s powers, arguing that when
we disregard those limitations “we place liberty at peril.”13
Although their arguments closely tracked one another, the
Chief Justice and the four dissenters did not join one another’s
opinions.14 One is thus left to wonder whether the five
Republican appointees’ reading of the Commerce Clause car-
ries the force of binding precedent.15 The well-known Marks
doctrine does not squarely answer that question; it simply
states that, when five or more Justices agree on which litigant
should prevail in a given case but do not agree on the reasons,
lower courts should regard themselves as bound by the “posi-
tion taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment
on the narrowest grounds.”16 In NFIB, however, the members
of the joint dissent were indeed dissenters, rather than mem-
bers concurring in the judgment.  Does that matter?  In a pos-
sible attempt to ensure that his analysis of the commerce issue
would be seen as essential to the ultimate outcome of the case
and thus binding on lower courts (with or without the support
of the four dissenters), the Chief Justice wrote that he would
not ultimately have found merit
in the government’s Taxing
Power argument if he had not
first rejected the government’s
reading of the Commerce Clause.
Whether that explanation is suf-
ficient to give the Chief Justice’s
commerce analysis the force of
precedent remains to be seen.
THE TAXING POWER AND
THE (NON-)MANDATE
As a fallback argument, the
government contended that the
individual mandate actually was not a mandate at all.  Rather,
that provision of the Act could be upheld as a simple exercise
of Congress’s power to levy taxes.  On this view, individuals are
not legally required to purchase health insurance; they simply
are assessed an additional tax if they opt not to do so.  All nine
justices believed that, if Congress had squarely called the
“shared responsibility payment” a “tax,” rather than a
“penalty,” the legislation could indeed have been sustained on
those grounds.  But Congress used the language of penalties,
not taxes.  Did that choice of wording matter?
Not in the eyes of five justices.  Joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Chief Justice Roberts said that
Congress’s choice of labels was not dispositive.  Under the
Court’s precedent, the Chief Justice explained, the Taxing
Power allows Congress to impose taxes, but not penalties.
These five justices found that the Act’s shared responsibility
payment fell into the former category:  it was imposed only on
those who were required to file federal income taxes; the
amount of the payment was to be calculated as a percentage of
individuals’ taxable income; the payment requirement was to
be enforced by the IRS; the measure was expected to produce
substantial revenue for the government; and the legislation
lacked the kind of scienter requirement that one typically finds
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17. 132 S. Ct. at 2651 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dis-
senting).
18. Id. at 2655 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
19. Id. at 2604 (Roberts, C.J.).
20. Id. (Roberts, C.J.).
21. Id. at 2605 (Roberts, C.J.).
22. Id. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, J.J., dissenting).
23. 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
in the context of civil and crim-
inal penalties.  The majority
concluded that individuals thus
are free to opt against carrying
health insurance; those making
that choice simply must pay
higher federal taxes when filing
their annual returns.
For Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito, however,
Congress’s choice of terminol-
ogy was controlling.  “The issue
is not whether Congress had
the power to frame the mini-
mum-coverage provision as a tax,” the joint dissenters wrote,
“but whether it did so.”17 In their view, the plain language of
the Act indicated that Congress had issued a mandate,
enforced by a penalty.  “To say that the Individual Mandate
merely imposes a tax,” the joint dissenters concluded, “is not
to interpret the statute but to rewrite it.”18 That argument sets
the stage for future battles about when Congress’s choice of
labels is and is not dispositive on the question of whether
Congress has properly exercised a given enumerated power.
THE SPENDING POWER AND THE MEDICAID
EXPANSION
Although the Court had occasionally suggested that
Congress’s conditional grants to the States would be unconsti-
tutional if they did not give states the freedom to reject the
conditions and decline the federal money, the Court had never
struck down a set of conditions on those grounds.  In NFIB,
however, seven justices concluded that Congress had crossed
the line separating permissible enticement from unconstitu-
tional coercion.
Joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, Chief Justice Roberts
found that, by threatening to withhold all of a state’s Medicaid
funds, Congress had not merely encouraged the States to par-
ticipate in the program’s expansion; rather, those conditions
were “a gun to the head.”19 The Chief Justice identified three
features of the Act that, taken together, were impermissibly
coercive:  federal Medicaid funds account for a large percent-
age of many states’ annual revenues; “the States have devel-
oped intricate statutory and administrative regimes over the
course of many decades to implement their objectives under
existing Medicaid”;20 and the Medicaid expansion was not a
mere alteration or amendment of the sort that Congress had
reserved the power to make, but instead amounted to an
entirely new program, marked by “a shift in kind, not merely
degree.”21 The four justices in the joint dissent agreed, finding
that “[i]f the anticoercion rule does not apply in this case, then
there is no such rule.”22
Two members of the Court found the conditions permissi-
ble.  Joined by Justice Sotomayor, Justice Ginsburg found that,
by expressly reserving the right to “alter” or “amend” the
Medicaid program, Congress had long ago put the states on
notice that a large expansion of the program was possible.
States had been further alerted to the possibility of a significant
expansion by all of the earlier occasions when, in smaller ways,
Congress had placed additional segments of the population
under the protection of the Medicaid umbrella.  She also
doubted the efficacy of her seven colleagues’ conclusion:  to
avoid the constitutional constraints that the majority had iden-
tified, she said, Congress simply could have repealed the entire
Medicaid program and then announced the creation of a new,
much broader benefits program identical to the one that
Congress envisioned in the Act.
On the question of what to do about the Spending Clause
violation that the other Justices had found, however, Justices
Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined the Chief Justice and Justices
Breyer and Kagan.  Those five justices concluded that the solu-
tion was not to invalidate the Medicaid expansion in its
entirety, but rather to enforce the Act’s conditions only with
respect to the new funding that Congress was offering for the
program’s expansion.  The four members of the joint dissent
would have scrapped the expansion altogether.
Going forward, one of the big challenges in Spending
Clause litigation will be further clarifying the line that sepa-
rates enticement from coercion.  What percentage of a state’s
federal revenues can the federal government permissibly
threaten to cut?  When and how does a state institutionalize a
given federal program to such a degree that Congress cannot
safely threaten to eliminate it?  How does one distinguish
between an amendment to a program and the creation of an
entirely new, subsuming program?  Were Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor right when they suggested that Congress could
evade the seven Justices’ Spending Clause restrictions by can-
celing an old program altogether and replacing it with a new
program of conditional federal spending?
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
DEFERENCE TO AGENCIES
In Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham Corp.,23 the Court was
asked to determine whether pharmaceutical companies’
“detailers”—employees who provide physicians with informa-
tion about drugs with the hope that physicians will prescribe
those drugs for their patients—are “outside salesmen” within
the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act.  Dividing 5-4, the
Court held that detailers are indeed outside salesmen and that
they thus do not benefit from the FLSA’s overtime-pay provi-
sions.  There was one point, however, on which all nine
Justices agreed:  the Department of Labor’s statutory interpre-
tation did not merit any deference from the Court.  Led by
Justice Alito, the five Justices in the majority elaborated on
their reasons for refusing to defer to the agency’s reading of the
FLSA.  The department’s employee-favoring interpretation
would “impose massive liability on [pharmaceuticals] for con-
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24. Id. at 2167-70.
25. 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
26. 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012).
27. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 278-80 (W.
Va. 2011).
28. Id. at 292.
29. 132 S. Ct. at 1202.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1203 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740, 1747 (2011)).
32. 132 S. Ct. 23 (2011).
duct that occurred well before that interpretation was
announced”; the agency never voiced any objection over the
many decades in which pharmaceutical companies treated
their detailers as outside salesmen; the agency’s initial inter-
pretation “lack[ed] the hallmarks of thorough consideration”
because it was first announced in a 2009 amicus brief without
any period for public comment; the agency’s interpretation
shifted during the course of litigation; and, in the eyes of the
majority, the agency’s reading of the statute was at odds with
the plain language of the statute.24
JUDICIAL REVIEW
In Sackett v. EPA,25 the Court unanimously ruled that the
owners of a residential lakeside lot were entitled to immediate
judicial review of a compliance order issued to them by the
Environmental Protection Agency.  The Sacketts had filled a
portion of their property with dirt and rock.  The EPA deter-
mined that the Sacketts had thereby discharged pollutants into
federal waters, and so issued a compliance order, directing the
Sacketts to restore the property.  For each day that the Sacketts
refused to comply, they faced civil penalties of up to $75,000.
Rather than wait for the EPA to file a civil enforcement action
while the possible penalties piled up, the Sacketts sought judi-
cial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, challeng-
ing the EPA’s claim that the Sacketts’ lot contained wetlands or
waters within the agency’s jurisdiction.  Writing for the Court,
Justice Scalia found that the EPA’s compliance order was suffi-
ciently final to merit judicial review under the APA and that
the Clean Water Act did not bar such pre-enforcement review.
ARBITRATION
In a trio of rulings, the Court expressed varying degrees of
frustration with lower courts for failing to follow what the
Court regarded as the clear requirements of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).  
Most of the Court’s impatience was directed toward the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Marmet Health
Care Center, Inc. v. Brown.26 In that case, family members of three
patients had entered into contracts with nursing homes.  A
clause in those contracts stated that the parties would arbitrate
any disputes that arose between them.  After the three patients
died, the family members sued the nursing homes, alleging that
the homes had negligently caused the patients’ deaths.  Denying
the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia did little to disguise its unhap-
piness with the Supreme Court’s FAA precedent.  Citing schol-
ars and dissenting justices, the West Virginia court stated that
Congress had intended the FAA “to serve only as a procedural
statute for disputes brought in federal courts,” that Congress had
intended the FAA to apply only in cases involving “contracts
between merchants with relatively equal bargaining power,” and
that the Supreme Court’s expansive interpretations of the FAA
were the result of “tendentious rea-
soning” and a willingness to create
doctrines “from whole cloth.”27
The West Virginia court neverthe-
less believed it had spotted an
opening in the Supreme Court’s
precedent—the Court had never
before explicitly addressed the
enforcement of pre-injury arbitra-
tion agreements in healthcare con-
tracts or in personal-injury or
wrongful-death cases.  The state
court filled that perceived gap by
ruling that the public policy of West Virginia barred enforcing
“an arbitration clause in a nursing home admission agreement
adopted prior to an occurrence of negligence that results in a
personal injury or wrongful death.”28
In a unanimous per curiam ruling, the Supreme Court
reversed, finding that the West Virginia court had patently
“misread[] and disregard[ed]” the Supreme Court’s prece-
dent.29 Noting the state court’s disparaging remarks about the
Court’s FAA rulings, the justices wrote that “[w]hen this Court
has fulfilled its duty to interpret federal law, a state court may
not contradict or fail to implement the rule so established.”30
The FAA does not include any exception relating to personal-
injury or wrongful-death cases, the Court observed.  All three
cases thus were governed by the rule that the Court had reaf-
firmed just two months before the West Virginia court handed
down its decision:  “‘[W]hen state law prohibits outright the
arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straight-
forward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.’”31
The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal provoked
another unanimous per curiam ruling in KPMG LLP v. Cocchi,32
though the tone of the exchange between the two courts was
less prickly.  In that case, investors who allegedly lost millions
of dollars in the Bernard Madoff scandal filed a lawsuit against
the partnerships that had invested their money and against
those partnerships’ auditing firm, KPMG.  With respect to
KPMG, the investors stated four causes of action.  KPMG
moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause that
appeared in its contracts with the investment partnerships.  The
Court of Appeal stated that the arbitration clause could be
enforced against the investors only if their claims were deriva-
tive in nature, thereby bringing them within the ambit of the
partnerships’ contracts with KPMG.  Citing Delaware law, the
court concluded that two of the investors’ claims against KPMG
were direct, and thus beyond the reach of the arbitration
clauses.  The court failed to say anything about the investors’
other two claims, however, apparently believing that if the court
could not compel arbitration of some of the investors’ claims,
then the entire case should remain in state court.
The Supreme Court reversed, faulting “the Court of
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36. Id. at 669.
37. Id. at 675 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
38. 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012).
39. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (authorizing a Fourth Amendment damages
action against federal employees).
40. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (authorizing an Eighth
Amendment damages action against employees at a prison run by
the federal government).
41. 132 S. Ct. at 625.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 627 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Carlson, 446 U.S. at
23).
44. 132 S. Ct. 2073 (2012).
Appeal’s apparent refusal to
compel arbitration on any of
the four claims based solely on
a finding that two of them . . .
were nonarbitrable.”33 The
Court stated that trial courts
are obliged to enforce arbitra-
tion agreements “‘even when
the result would be the possi-
bly inefficient maintenance of
separate proceedings in differ-
ent forums.’”34 The Court
remanded the case with
instructions to determine
whether the arbitration agreement was enforceable with
respect to the investors’ other two causes of action.
The Court’s third arbitration ruling of the Term was the only
one to spark at least minimal disagreement among the Justices.
In CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,35 individuals who had
obtained Aspire Visa cards filed a class action against the card’s
marketer and issuer.  The cardholders alleged that, in various
ways, the defendants had violated the Credit Repair
Organizations Act (CROA), a federal statute regulating organi-
zations that purport to help individuals improve their credit
records, histories, or ratings.  The defendants moved to com-
pel arbitration, citing an arbitration clause that appeared in the
card applications that the plaintiffs had signed.  The cardhold-
ers resisted, arguing that Congress had intended to exempt
CROA claims from the requirements of the FAA.  Their argu-
ment centered primarily on a statutorily required disclosure
statement that the defendants had given them.  In that disclo-
sure statement, the defendants had stated that cardholders had
“a right to sue a credit repair organization that violates the
[CROA].”36 That statement, coupled with a provision of the
CROA that declared certain statutory rights nonwaivable, led
the cardholders to the conclusion that they had a right to sue
the defendants in court, and that the arbitration clauses in
their card applications could not waive that right.  
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was persuaded by the
cardholders’ argument, but a majority of the Supreme Court
was not.  Writing for six members of the Court, Justice Scalia
explained that the disclosure statement told the cardholders
that they were entitled to enforce their rights under the statute,
but did not itself confer any of those rights.  Those rights were
conferred in other statutory provisions, he said, and those
other provisions did not clearly state that cardholders had a
right to sue in court.  Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan con-
curred in the judgment, stating that the parties’ arguments
were “in equipoise” and that the cardholders had thus failed to
carry “the burden of showing that Congress disallowed arbi-
tration of their claims.”37 Justice Ginsburg filed a lone dissent.
In her view, the majority had ironically interpreted anti-decep-
tion legislation in a manner that permitted credit-repair orga-
nizations to deceive vulnerable consumers about their rights.
BIVENS AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
In Minneci v. Pollard,38 the Court refused to allow a prisoner
to bring an Eighth Amendment Bivens action against employ-
ees of a privately operated federal prison.39 The prisoner
claimed that the defendants failed to provide him with proper
medical care after he injured his elbows and that the Eighth
Amendment itself provided him with a damages remedy.  The
odds were stacked against him from the beginning:  it had been
more than 30 years since the Court last agreed to recognize a
private cause of action directly under a constitutional provi-
sion.40 An eight-justice majority of the Court continued that
streak here.
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer explained that “the
question is whether, in general, state tort law remedies provide
roughly similar incentives for potential defendants to comply
with the Eighth Amendment while also providing roughly sim-
ilar compensation to victims of violations.”41 The Court found
that, while federal legislation would have barred the prisoner
from bringing a state tort action against the prison officials if
those officials had been employed directly by the federal gov-
ernment, there was no such bar here because the defendants
were employed by a private firm.  The Court acknowledged
that state tort law might be somewhat “less generous” to the
prisoner than the proposed Bivens action, but found those dif-
ferences too small to be dispositive.42 Justice Ginsburg dis-
sented, arguing that the prisoner’s claim should not be
“remit[ed] to the ‘vagaries’ of state tort law.”43
EQUAL PROTECTION AND RATIONAL-BASIS REVIEW
In Armour v. City of Indianapolis,44 we were reminded of just
how easy it is for legislation to survive rational-basis review
under the Equal Protection Clause.  For a number of years, the
City of Indianapolis paid for sewer projects by imposing those
projects’ costs upon the owners of abutting properties.  In
2004, the city funded a residential sewer project in precisely
that way.  Pursuant to longstanding practice, homeowners in
that neighborhood were given the option of paying their share
of the costs (about $9,000 per household) in one lump sum or
over as many as thirty years.  The following year, however, the
city adopted a new financing system for sewer projects, impos-
ing much lower fees on benefiting property owners and cover-
116 Court Review - Volume 48 
[T]he Court
refused to allow 
a prisoner to
bring an Eighth
Amendment
Bivens action
against employees
of a privately
operated federal
prison.
45. Id. at 2087 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
46. 132 S. Ct. 740 (2012).
47. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).
48. 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012).
49. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
50. 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012).
ing the balance of the costs with bonds.  When the city made
the switch, it told homeowners who were paying their past
obligations in installments that their remaining debts were for-
given, but it refused to issue refunds to homeowners who had
already paid their debts in full.  Many of the homeowners who
had already paid off their debts sued the city, alleging a viola-
tion of their equal-protection rights.
Affirming Indiana’s high court, the Supreme Court found a
rational basis for the city’s differing treatment of the homeown-
ers.  Writing for six justices, Justice Breyer said that either of the
city’s other alternatives—asking the installment-paying home-
owners to continue paying down their debts or issuing refunds
to those who had already paid their obligations in full—would
have entailed administrative costs that the city rationally could
have wished to avoid.  Joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, Chief
Justice Roberts dissented.  The Chief Justice agreed that “we
give great leeway to taxing authorities in this area,” but argued
that “every generation or so a case comes along when this Court
needs to say enough is enough, if the Equal Protection Clause
is to retain any force in this context.”45
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
FEDERAL CAUSES OF ACTION
In Mims v. Arrow Financial Services,46 the Court unani-
mously ruled that state and federal courts have concurrent
subject-matter jurisdiction over private claims brought under
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991.  The Act pro-
vides a private cause of action for invasive telemarketing prac-
tices and authorizes plaintiffs to sue “in an appropriate court
of [a] State” if such an action is “otherwise permitted by the
laws or rules of court of [that] State.”47 The justices found that
Congress did not thereby grant state courts exclusive jurisdic-
tion over private claims brought under the Act.  Writing for the
Court, Justice Ginsburg explained that when federal law cre-
ates a cause of action and provides the substantive rules for
adjudicating that cause of action, there is a strong presumption
in favor of at least concurrent original federal jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  That presumption can be overcome
only if—contrary to the facts here—Congress made it clear
that it intended to divest the federal courts of their power to
adjudicate the claims.
POLITICAL-QUESTION DOCTRINE
In Zivotofsky v. Clinton,48 the Court clarified the scope of the
political-question doctrine.  The State Department had
adopted a policy directing passport officials to list Jerusalem,
rather than Israel, as the place of birth when preparing pass-
ports for persons born in Jerusalem.  In 2002, Congress
responded by enacting legislation stating that individuals born
in Jerusalem could, upon their or their guardians’ request, list
Israel as their place of birth on their birth certificates or pass-
ports.  Upon Menachem Zovotofsky’s birth in Jerusalem, his
parents (who were American citizens) applied for a United
States passport for him and asked that his place of birth be
listed as “Jerusalem, Israel.”
Citing its policy, the State
Department refused and issued
Zivotosky a passport that listed
only “Jerusalem” as his place of
birth.  His parents sued the
Secretary of State for declara-
tory and injunctive relief.
Affirming the district court’s
dismissal of the case as a non-
justiciable political question,
the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit found that
adjudicating the case would
interfere with the Executive’s
exclusive power to recognize
foreign sovereigns and deter-
mine the political status of Jerusalem.  The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded.  Writing for six members of the Court,
Chief Justice Roberts agreed that the federal judiciary cannot
itself decide whether Jerusalem is Israel’s capital, but found
that the case presented separate questions over which the
courts do have the power to speak—namely, whether the
Secretary of State violated Zivotofsky’s federal statutory rights
and whether the legislation on which Zivotofsky relied is con-
stitutional.  If the statute infringes upon the President’s power,
the Court wrote, then the courts should declare the statute
unconstitutional, rather than declare the case nonjusticiable.
FIFTH AMENDMENT—DUE PROCESS
Many court-watchers had anticipated that the Federal
Communications Commission’s recent actions against Fox
Television Stations and ABC for fleeting expletives and fleeting
nudity would prompt the Court to reassess its 1978 ruling in
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.49 Pacifica has come under increas-
ing pressure in recent years, as changes in technology and the
media landscape have caused many to wonder whether the
Pacifica Court’s rationales for allowing the government to
restrict broadcasts of indecency remain apt.  It turns out, how-
ever, that the FCC’s enforcement actions against Fox and ABC
tripped over the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
instead, leaving the First Amendment issues to be decided
another day.
In FCC v. Fox Television Stations (consolidated with FCC v.
ABC, Inc.),50 the Court focused on three instances of alleged
indecency:  Cher’s unscripted use of the f-word during the
2002 Billboard Music Awards, broadcast by Fox; Nicole
Richie’s unscripted use of the s- and f-words during the same
awards show on Fox the following year; and a seven-second
display of an actress’s buttocks (together with a momentary
side view of one of her breasts) during a 2003 episode of ABC’s
NYPD Blue.
To understand the Court’s decision, a brief timeline is
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required.  When the Pacifica
Court announced First
Amendment standards allowing
the FCC to regulate the broad-
cast of indecent speech, it explic-
itly noted that it was reserving
judgment on whether “an occa-
sional expletive . . . would justify
any sanction.”51 For many years,
the FCC took few actions against
broadcast indecency.  In 2001,
the FCC signaled that it would
begin to move more aggressively
against indecency, but stated that
an enforcement action was less
likely if the given instance of
alleged indecency was “‘fleeting
in nature.’”52 In response to an award recipient’s use the f-word
during NBC’s 2003 broadcast of the Golden Globe Awards,
however, the FCC issued what has come to be known as the
Golden Globes Order, finding that NBC’s broadcast of the f-word
was indecent despite its single and momentary use.
The FCC applied the Golden Globes standard against Fox
and ABC, even though their broadcasts occurred prior to the
Golden Globes Order, and even though in Golden Globes itself
the FCC opted not to fine NBC because the agency recognized
it was using that case to announce new standards.  With Justice
Sotomayor not participating, eight justices concluded that the
FCC’s actions against Fox and ABC were unconstitutional.
Justice Kennedy wrote for seven members of the Court, find-
ing that punishing Fox and ABC would violate the fundamen-
tal due-process principle “that laws which regulate persons or
entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden.”53 At
the time of the FOX and ABC broadcasts, the Court found, the
FCC’s policies “gave no notice to Fox or ABC that a fleeting
expletive or a brief shot of nudity could be actionably inde-
cent.”54 The Court thus found it unnecessary to determine the
constitutionality of the Golden Globes Order or to reassess the
Pacifica standards.
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment, briefly stating
that Pacifica “was wrong when issued” and that “[t]ime, tech-
nological advances, and the Commission’s untenable rulings in
the cases now before the Court show why Pacifica bears recon-
sideration.”55 Five months later, concurring in the Court’s
denial of certiorari in the case concerning Janet Jackson’s
(in)famous “wardrobe malfunction” during a Super Bowl half-
time performance,56 Justice Ginsburg encouraged the FCC to
“reconsider its indecency policy in light of technological
advances and the Commission’s uncertain course of conduct
since this Court’s ruling in [Pacifica].”57
FIRST AMENDMENT—RELIGION
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
EEOC,58 the Court ruled that both the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause bar ministers from suing their
religious employers for employment discrimination.  Hosanna-
Tabor had hired Cheryl Perich to work as a schoolteacher.
Based on Perich’s completion of a variety of academic require-
ments, Hosanna-Tabor had designated Perich as a “called”
teacher, granting her the title of “Minister of Religion,
Commissioned.”  In that capacity, Perich spent most of her
time teaching secular subjects, but she also taught a religion
class several days each week, led students in prayer, attended
weekly chapel services, and led those chapel services twice
each year.  After Perich missed a significant portion of the
2004-2005 school year due to illness, Hosanna-Tabor hired
another teacher to fill the gap for the remainder of the year.
Perich insisted that she be allowed to return to work, but
Hosanna-Tabor refused.  When Perich threatened to take legal
action to protect her rights, Hosanna-Tabor terminated her, cit-
ing her threat of litigation.  The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission sued Hosanna-Tabor on Perich’s
behalf, alleging that Hosanna-Tabor had violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act by retaliating against Perich
for threatening to vindicate her ADA rights. Hosanna-Tabor
argued that it had terminated Perich because, by threatening to
sue, she had violated the church’s religious teaching that
church members should resolve their disputes internally.
Led by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court ruled unanimously
in Hosanna-Tabor’s favor, joining the many circuit courts that
had already recognized a “ministerial exception” to employ-
ment-discrimination laws.  “Requiring a church to accept or
retain an unwanted minister,” the Chief Justice wrote, “inter-
feres with the internal governance of the church, depriving the
church of control over the selection of those who will person-
ify its beliefs.”59 The Court declined “to adopt a rigid formula
for determining when an employee qualifies as a minister,”
choosing instead to begin its line of “ministerial exception”
cases by engaging in a fact-intensive analysis of Perich’s own
circumstances.60 The Court found that Perich was a minister
because Hosanna-Tabor had formally designated her in those
terms, Perich had held herself out to the church and others as
a minister, and Perich’s job duties included conveying the
church’s teachings and performing other religious functions. In
response to the EEOC’s insistence that recognizing a minister-
ial exception would license religious groups to engage in
118 Court Review - Volume 48 
[T]he Court ruled
that both the
Free Exercise
Clause and the
Establishment
Clause bar 
ministers from
suing their 
religious 
employers for
employment 
discrimination.
61. Id. at 710.
62. 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012),
63. 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012).
64. On the criminal side, see United States v. Alvarez, 132 S Ct. 2537
(2012) (finding an irreconcilable conflict between the First
Amendment and the Stolen Valor Act).
65. 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010).
66. MONT. CODE ANN. §13-35-227(1) (2011).
67. 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
68. Id. at 2491 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
69. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
70. 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
71. Justices Breyer and Kagan dissented, relying in part upon argu-
ments relating to administrative burdens and the SEIU’s prior
under-charging of nonmembers for chargeable expenses.
72. 132 S. Ct. at 2289.
objectionable behavior (such as hiring children or aliens, or
punishing ministerial employees for reporting criminal con-
duct), the Court said that it would “address the applicability of
the exception to other circumstances if and when they arise.”61
FIRST AMENDMENT—SPEECH
In addition to Reichle v. Howards62 (which concerned speech
but is better categorized as a qualified-immunity case) and
FCC v. Fox Television Stations63 (which has First Amendment
implications but is better categorized as a Fifth Amendment
case), the Court decided two noteworthy civil free-speech
cases last Term.64
CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND CORPORATE SPEECH
In its 2010 ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, the Supreme Court ruled (among other things)
that “independent expenditures, including those made by cor-
porations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption” in American elections.65 The following year, the
Montana Supreme Court declared that, due to that State’s par-
ticularly rocky history of corporate corruption in state politics,
the Montana Legislature was permitted to impose civil penal-
ties on any corporation that makes “a contribution or an
expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political com-
mittee that supports or opposes a candidate or a political
party.”66 In American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock,67 a five-
justice majority of the Court summarily reversed in a one-page
per curiam ruling, finding Citizens United wholly dispositive.
Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justice
Breyer filed a short dissent, stating that Citizens United was
wrongly decided and that, even if the Court’s ruling in that case
were apt in some jurisdictions, Montana’s history gave it a par-
ticularly “compelling interest in limiting independent expen-
ditures by corporations.”68
UNIONS—NONMEMBERS AND SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS
Although the Court’s holding in Knox v. Service Employees
International Union69 is noteworthy in its own right, far more
significant is five justices’ suggestion in dicta that prior courts
have given their blessing to arrangements that might violate
the First Amendment.
Under the Court’s past cases, a public-sector union may
annually bill nonmember employees in a given unit to help pay
the costs of that unit’s “chargeable expenses”—namely, the costs
of engaging in the kind of collective-bargaining activities that
inure to the benefit of all of a unit’s employees.  The Court has
said, however, that the First Amendment bars a union from forc-
ing nonmembers to help pay for the union’s political and ideo-
logical activities.  Following the procedure approved in Teachers
v. Hudson,70 a union can annu-
ally notify members and non-
members alike of what the
union’s dues will be for the com-
ing year, so long as it gives non-
members an opportunity to “opt
out” from the union’s political
and ideological activities and
thus pay reduced fees targeted
solely for the union’s anticipated
chargeable expenses.
In Knox, a public-sector
union in California (the SEIU)
announced to members and
nonmembers what the annual
dues would be for 2005 and
gave nonmembers a period of
time to opt out from the political and ideological portion of the
tab.  After that opt-out period had closed, however, the SEIU
concluded that it needed to raise additional money quickly to
engage in political battles that were taking shape in the state.
The SEIU issued a special assessment aimed at creating what it
called “a Political Fight-Back Fund.”  It did not give nonmem-
bers the ability to opt out, but it did tell those nonmembers
who earlier had opted out from the political and ideological
portion of the annual dues that they could pay a comparably
reduced portion of the special assessment.
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas, Justice Alito found that the First
Amendment obliged the SEIU to provide nonmembers with a
period of time in which to decide whether they wanted to con-
tribute to the Fight-Back Fund, and that the union could col-
lect funds from nonmembers for the Fight-Back Fund only if
they affirmatively opted in.  Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg
concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the SEIU had vio-
lated nonmembers’ rights but objecting to the majority’s deci-
sion to require an opt-in (rather than an opt-out) scheme.71
What is most significant about the ruling—and what espe-
cially drew the criticism of Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg in
their concurrence in the judgment and Justices Breyer and
Kagan in their dissent—was the discomfort that the majority
expressed with some of the Court’s prior rulings regarding
unions and nonmember employees.  Justice Alito stressed that
forcing public-sector employees to contribute to unions—even
if for collective-bargaining activities—raises serious First
Amendment concerns.  “Our cases to date have tolerated this
‘impingement,’” he wrote, “and we do not revisit today
whether the Court’s former cases have given adequate recogni-
tion to the critical First Amendment rights at stake.”72 He
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expressed strong doubts
about whether the desire to
prevent free-riding was suf-
ficient to justify those
forced contributions by
nonmembers.  He also crit-
icized the current rule that
unions can require non-
members to opt out if they
do not wish to pay for the
union’s political and ideo-
logical activities as part of
their annual fees, rather
than presume that non-
members do not wish to
contribute and therefore
require them to opt in if
that presumption is mistaken.  Justice Alito stated that the cur-
rent arrangement is “ a remarkable boon for unions,” that the
Court has paid “surprisingly little attention” to the choice
between opt-out and opt-in arrangements, and that the Court’s
prior approval of opt-out schemes is “an historical accident”
resulting from the Court’s thinly considered “dicta” in a case
half a century ago.73 The majority indicated that those past
rulings “approach, if they do not cross, the limit of what the
First Amendment can tolerate,” but the justices did not find it
necessary to resolve that question here.74 Non-union employ-
ees who bristle at the current state of the law undoubtedly will
find in Knox an invitation to give the Court an opportunity to
address these matters anew.
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The Court decided two noteworthy qualified-immunity
cases last Term, the first dealing with private individuals’ enti-
tlement to qualified immunity when they do short-term work
for governmental bodies and the second dealing with retalia-
tory arrests.
Invoking memories of a time in American history when pri-
vate individuals frequently stepped in to help city, state, and
federal entities carry out their business, the Court ruled in
Filarsky v. Delia75 that a private attorney may claim qualified
immunity when sued under Section 1983 for the role he played
in helping city officials investigate allegations of wrongdoing
by a city employee.  The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit had held that the attorney could not claim qual-
ified immunity because he was not a city employee.  The
Supreme Court unanimously reversed.  Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Roberts returned to the familiar principle that
Section 1983 did not abrogate well-established common-law
immunities.  Citing numerous examples, the Chief Justice said
that, in the years leading up to Section 1983’s enactment, gov-
ernments frequently retained private individuals to help do the
public’s work, and courts did not distinguish between those
private individuals and government employees when affording
immunity to suit.
In Reichle v. Howards,76 the Court ruled that Secret Service
agents could raise the qualified-immunity defense in a lawsuit
arising from an incident that occurred when they were pro-
tecting Vice President Dick Cheney at a Colorado shopping
mall.  Steven Howards had approached the Vice President and
told him that the administration’s policies in Iraq were “dis-
gusting,” then touched the Vice President’s shoulder as the
Vice President walked away.  Secret Service agents approached
Howards, who falsely denied touching the Vice President.
Possessing probable cause to believe that Howards had lied to
them and had physically touched the Vice President, the agents
placed Howards under arrest.  State officials charged him with
harassment, but those charges were later dropped.  Howards
then sued the agents under Section 1983 and Bivens, alleging
that the agents had arrested him in retaliation for his remarks
to the Vice President about Iraq.  Writing for six members of
the Court, Justice Thomas found that the agents were entitled
to qualified immunity because “it was not clearly established
that an arrest supported by probable cause could violate the
First Amendment.”77 The Court reserved judgment on the
merits of the overarching constitutional question, declining to
say whether a person does indeed have a First Amendment
right to be free from a retaliatory arrest when officials have
probable cause to arrest on other grounds.  Joined by Justice
Breyer, Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment.
Distinguishing ordinary law-enforcement officers from those
charged with protecting public officials, she argued that the
former would not be entitled to qualified immunity in compa-
rable circumstances, but that officers charged with making
split-second assessments of threats to public officials are enti-
tled to rely on an individual’s statements when determining
whether that person poses an immediate threat of harm.
(Justice Kagan did not participate in the case.)
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE FMLA
In Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland,78 the Court
returned to the task of evaluating efforts by Congress to use its
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abro-
gate a state’s sovereign immunity.  Daniel Coleman had sued the
Maryland Court of Appeals (his former employer), alleging that
the court violated his rights under the Family and Medical Leave
Act by denying him sick leave.  The FMLA identifies several cir-
cumstances in which an eligible employee is annually entitled to
up to twelve weeks of leave.  Most of the statute’s provisions con-
cern instances in which an employee needs to care for an ailing
family member, but the “self-care” provision on which Coleman
relied entitles an employee to obtain leave when “a serious
health condition . . . makes the employee unable to perform the
functions of” his or her job.79 The Court already had ruled in
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs80 that Congress
validly stripped the states of their immunity for violations of one
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SUPREMACY CLAUSE
In Douglas v. Independent
Living Center of Southern
California,85 a slim majority of
the Court decided to sidestep,
at least for the time being, the
difficult question on which it
had granted certiorari:  can
Medicaid providers and benefi-
ciaries maintain a cause of
action directly under the
Supremacy Clause to enjoin
state officials from implement-
ing state regulations that
allegedly are preempted by fed-
eral law?  To alleviate stress on
its budget, California had
announced that it planned to
reduce the rates at which it
would reimburse certain
Medicaid providers.  Pursuant
to federal requirements,
California submitted those
plans to the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) for approval.  While that request for approval
was pending, various Medicaid providers and beneficiaries
filed federal lawsuits seeking to enjoin California officials from
implementing the reimbursement reductions.  The plaintiffs
argued that California’s plans conflicted with—and thus were
preempted by—Section 30(A) of the Medicaid Act, which
requires states to provide reimbursements “sufficient to enlist
enough providers so that care and services are available under
the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are
available to the general population in the geographic area.”86
After the case was orally argued before the Supreme Court, the
CMS approved most of the state’s planned reductions, finding
them consistent with the Medicaid Act’s requirements.  The
Court then had to determine whether the CMS’s approval had
any bearing on the Court’s disposition of the case.
Writing on behalf of himself and Justices Kennedy,
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justice Breyer concluded
that the case should be remanded without immediate resolu-
tion of the Supremacy Clause issue.  Given the CMS’s approval
of the reductions, Justice Breyer found, it was possible that the
unhappy Medicaid providers and beneficiaries should now be
required to seek judicial review of the CMS’s decision under
the Administrative Procedure Act, rather than continue to
press for relief in an action brought directly under the
Supremacy Clause.  Justice Breyer hinted that the plaintiffs
faced an uphill climb:  the CMS was not a party to the pending
Supremacy Clause litigation, making that litigation an ineffi-
cient vehicle for adjudicating the merits of the agency’s find-
ings; allowing a Supremacy Clause action to proceed would
81. 132 S. Ct. at 1335 (plurality op.).
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of the family-care provisions because Congress was rectifying a
history of sex-based discrimination in states’ administration of
their family-leave policies.  Here in Coleman, however, five jus-
tices concluded that states retained their immunity against dam-
ages suits for violations of the self-care provision.
Justice Kennedy wrote for a plurality of the Court, joined by
the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Alito.  Invoking the
Court’s reigning Section 5 analysis, the plurality found that the
self-care provision was not “congruent and proportional” to any
pattern of unconstitutional behavior by the states, and thus
amounted to an effort by Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth
Amendment.81 When Congress enacted the FMLA, the plural-
ity wrote, nearly all state employees were covered by paid sick-
leave plans, and Congress never identified any pattern of sex
discrimination in the states’ administration of those plans.  The
plurality rejected Coleman’s argument that the self-care provi-
sion was meant to attack sex discrimination in tandem with the
family-care provisions.  Coleman’s argument went like this:  if
only the FMLA’s family-care provisions had been enacted, some
public and private employers would fear that women would
miss a lot of work to care for sick family members; those
employers thus would have an incentive to discriminate against
female job applicants; and so Congress added the self-care pro-
vision to provide a category of leave that men would use,
thereby helping to close the gap between the amounts of time
that men and women could be expected to miss work.  The plu-
rality found this argument “overly complicated,” “unconvinc-
ing,” and unsupported by the legislative record.82
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, reiterating his
view that, “outside the context of racial discrimination (which
is different for stare decisis reasons),” the congruence and pro-
portionality test should be abandoned and Congress’s power
under Section 5 should be limited to regulating “conduct that
itself violates the Fourteenth Amendment.”83
Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan.  She found that Congress wrote the self-
care provision in broad, gender-neutral terms to shield women
from the discrimination that might result if federal law had
more narrowly provided self-care leaves only for illnesses relat-
ing to pregnancy and childbirth.  Drawing heavily from Hibbs,
Justice Ginsburg wrote that Congress had substantial evidence
of public employers’ discrimination against women—especially
pregnant women—in the workplace.  The dissent concluded by
offering employees a measure of solace.  As the Maryland court
itself conceded, Justice Ginsburg wrote, the self-care provision
is inarguably a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause.  While that is not sufficient under the
Court’s precedent to permit Congress to abrogate a state’s
immunity from suits for damages, she said, it is sufficient for
employees to get injunctive relief under Ex parte Young84 and for
the federal government to seek relief on an employee’s behalf.
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cause “inconsistency or confu-
sion” if the federal courts ulti-
mately reached a conclusion
that differed from the CMS’s
findings; and courts typically
owe a measure of deference to
agencies’ interpretations of the
legislation they have been
tasked with implementing.87
Joined by Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito, Chief
Justice Roberts dissented,
arguing that the Court should
have resolved the Supremacy
Clause issue in favor of the
state.  Congress had not itself
provided a private cause of
action to enforce Section
30(A), the Chief Justice wrote,
and so permitting an action
directly under the Supremacy Clause would allow plaintiffs
to make an “end-run” around precedent that bars plaintiffs
from suing to enforce federal statutes in the absence of a
statutory cause of action.88 Acknowledging the longstanding
availability of injunctive relief against state officials under Ex
parte Young,89 the dissent argued that such relief is available
in the absence of a federal statutory cause of action only if—
unlike the Medicaid providers and beneficiaries here—the
plaintiff is threatened with a state enforcement proceeding
and wishes preemptively to assert a federal defense.  In sup-
port of that reading of Ex parte Young, the dissent cited a line
from a 2011 concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy.90 When
a majority of the Court agrees that the time is ripe to resolve
this important issue, Justice Kennedy might indeed cast the
decisive vote.
OTHER NOTABLE RULINGS
In Astrue v. Capato,91 the Court unanimously confirmed the
Social Security Administration’s finding that the two posthu-
mously conceived claimants in this case did not qualify for sur-
vivors benefits under the Social Security Act.  To determine
whether a given claimant is the “child” of a decedent and thus
eligible for survivors benefits, the Act directs the Social
Security Commissioner’s attention to the laws of intestacy in
the state where the claimant resides:  if the claimant is ineligi-
ble to inherit under that state’s intestacy laws, the claimant is
typically deemed not to be a “child” of the decedent within the
meaning of the Act.  The two claimants in this case resided in
Florida, which restricts intestate succession to individuals con-
ceived during the decedent’s lifetime.  The claimants (con-
ceived through in vitro fertilization after the father’s death)
thus were ineligible for survivors benefits.
In FAA v. Cooper,92 the Court ruled 5-4 that when Congress
stated in the Privacy Act of 1974 that an individual may sue an
agency for “actual damages” resulting from certain kinds of
“intentional or willful” violations of the Act,93 Congress did
not thereby waive the federal government’s sovereign immu-
nity against claims seeking damages for mental or emotional
distress.  Rather, it only waived the government’s immunity
against claims for pecuniary damages.
In Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc.,94 the Court unanimously
held that a provision of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act (12 U.S.C. § 2607(b)) bars a settlement-service provider
from giving or accepting a portion of a settlement-service
charge to a different person or entity that did nothing to earn
the payment, but it does not bar a settlement-service provider
from itself collecting unearned fees from clients.  The Court
reserved judgment on whether fees paid by borrowers to
obtain lower interest rates are settlement-service charges
within the meaning of the statute.
In Golan v. Holder,95 the Court held that Congress acted
within the constraints of the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment when it granted copyright protection to previ-
ously created works that had already entered the public
domain.
In Holder v. Martinez-Gutierrez,96 the Court unanimously
accepted as reasonable the Board of Immigration Appeals’ con-
clusion that the Attorney General cannot cancel an alien child’s
removal from the United States unless the child himself or her-
self satisfies the statute’s residency requirements for such can-
cellation.  The parents’ years of residency within the United
States cannot be imputed to the child.
In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,97
the Court denied patent protection to a company that had
done little more than identify a correlation between (1) the
quantity of a person’s natural production of certain metabolites
in response to taking thiopurine drugs to treat autoimmune
diseases and (2) the likelihood that the person’s dosage would
be either ineffectively low or harmfully high. In seeking patent
protection, the Court found, the company had merely
described natural laws, rather than set forth a unique way to
apply them.
In PPL Montana v. Montana,98 the Court clarified the test by
which courts and others are to determine whether states hold
title to particular riverbeds.  PPL operated numerous hydro-
electric facilities on three rivers in Montana.  Montana con-
tended that it held title to the full length of any river’s bed
within the state’s borders, so long as much (even if not all) of
that river was navigable at the time Montana acquired state-
hood in 1889.  The state thus claimed that it could charge PPL
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rent.  In PPL’s view, however, a segment-by-segment analysis
was required, with the federal government continuing to hold
title to the riverbeds in those particular areas that were not
navigable in 1889.  Drawing from English common law, a line
of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Supreme Court rulings,
and a wealth of historical research about the exploration of
American rivers, the Court unanimously sided with PPL.
In Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.,99 the Court held
that 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6), which authorizes federal courts to
award a prevailing party costs for “compensation of inter-
preters,” only covers costs for oral translations, and not costs
for translating written documents.  “Based on our survey of
the relevant dictionaries,” Justice Alito wrote for six members
of the Court, “we conclude that the ordinary or common
meaning of ‘interpreter’ does not include those who translate
writings.”100
In United States v. Home Concrete Supply,101 the Court held
that the ordinary three-year statute of limitations (rather than
a more narrowly available six-year statute of limitations)
applies to efforts by the federal government to collect unpaid
income taxes resulting from taxpayers’ overstatement of their
basis in sold property.  The statute providing a six-year limita-
tions period applies only when (among other things) a tax-
payer “omits from gross income an amount properly included
therein.”102 By a 5-4 vote, the Court found that the word
“omits” denotes leaving something unmentioned, and thus
does not include instances when a taxpayer inflates his or her
basis in property.
LOOKING AHEAD
At the time of this writing, the Court is slated to hear a
number of attention-worthy civil cases during the 2012-2013
Term.  The case likely to draw the most press is Fisher v.
University of Texas,103 in which the Court will take a close look
at the University of Texas’s race-conscious undergraduate
admissions policy.  Other pending cases of broad interest to the
legal profession will address whether Congress exceeded its
constitutional authority when it reauthorized Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act,104 a state’s effort to require proof of citizen-
ship by individuals attempting to register to vote,105 employers’
vicarious liability under Title VII for harassment committed by
supervisors,106 corporations’ civil tort liability under the Alien
Tort Statute,107 whether a state may deny citizens of other
states the same right of access to public records that it affords
to its own citiens,108 the United States’ liability for damages
resulting from its own violations of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act,109 the threshold at which periodic flooding becomes a
compensable taking under the Takings Clause,110 whether
courts owe any measure of deference to a federal agency’s
determination of its own statutory jurisdiction,111 the circum-
stances in which a case becomes moot as a result of defendants’
settlement offers,112 whether attorneys can use personal infor-
mation obtained from a state’s department of motor vehicles to
identify possible clients,113 the reach of the Clean Water Act
and the modes by which citizens can enforce that legislation,114
the application of copyright law’s first-sale doctrine to copies
acquired abroad and imported into the United States,115 issues
relating to patent exhaustion and self-replicating technolo-
gies,116 employees’ plan-reimbursement obligations under
ERISA,117 and various issues relating to class actions.118
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